驯服巨兽——大型建筑项目的管理策略
文/Mark Ingebretsen 译/赵克琛
政治斗争、预算超支和设计缺陷困扰着许多的大型项目。项目经理可以通过一些创新和策略来避免上述令人头痛的状况。
建造图库鲁伊大坝是一件异常艰巨的工作。图库鲁伊大坝座落于巴西东北部偏远繁茂的亚马逊地区，大坝和相邻的筑堤用长达12.5公里的混凝土围成了一个面积达2850平方公里的湖区。
然而在图库鲁伊大坝的建设过程中，问题突现出来：经常会发生一些问题招致代价昂贵的决策，迫使原计划变更。某些决策是在政治抗议的背景下做出的，比如使用昂贵的巴西水泥替代哥伦比亚的原材料。另外一些决策则起因于预期的资金未到位，例如，大坝水电站推迟三年投入使用。还有部分决策，像废弃一种水闸系统以适应运输要求则是由费用原因引起的。在资金供给短缺时，通过火车取代驳船运输矿石则更为可行。
这些变更导致的一个结果是，在1974年估计预算36亿美元的图库鲁伊大坝最终在12年后交付时花费超过55亿美元。
实际上，大型项目通常会因其导致的问题而声名狼藉。《Megaprojects and Risk》一书的作者本特·弗莱杰格、尼尔斯·布鲁兹利斯和沃纳·罗森加特尔表示：“现在存在一个矛盾：在全球计划和建造更多更大建筑项目的同时，有个趋势变得愈加明显，即诸如此类的项目在经济、环境和公共支持上的记录表现明显差劲。
解决纠纷
政治因素会拖延项目数年并耗尽项目预算，而且还会导致更高的潜在费用。如下即是一个案例：伍德鲁·威尔逊大桥由于其频繁的推迟开工而广为美国华盛顿的工人们熟知。大桥的设计车流量是每天7.5万辆，而现在每天有超过20万辆车过桥。尽管美国马里兰州和弗吉尼亚州都意识到扩建大桥的必要性，但是实际开工之前却浪费了超过十年。
Washington Business Forward杂志指出：“数年来，马里兰州和弗吉尼亚州的州长们为了预算超支部分的付费方和大桥的所有权等事情争吵不休。”据说，这些争吵导致了3亿美元的超支。
某些利益集团将大桥混乱的交通状况当作是促进自己计划的机会，即通过修建一条桥上铁路来扩展首都的地铁系统。这个策略意味着将商业保留在华盛顿市区，这样会限制郊区的蔓延。而另一些集团认为增加威尔逊桥上车道的数量会减轻耗费巨大的交通混乱。
由于存在如此多的项目干系人，更多明智的项目经理将纠纷解决方法写入总体项目计划中，帕特里克·韦弗如是说。韦弗是澳大利亚墨尔本的项目管理公司Mosaic项目服务公司的总监。他认为，当纷争发生时，外部专家会评估现状并提供建议。
下一步，调节人会参与进来指定出折衷方案。调解失败的话，就会诉诸仲裁，这样，解决方案就是强制的。以上步骤失败之后，耗时又昂贵的诉讼就是最后的手段了。
韦弗说，这套流程比较复杂，你必须了解采取每一步骤的适当时机。例如，如果调解人过早地发挥作用，各方会感觉权利被剥夺而不会认同调解人的方案。如果项目经理让调解人介入太晚的话，项目干系人会相互产生反感。
然而，在某些情况下，没有足够的时间执行层层上报的纠纷解决方法。城市规划和建筑师安德鲁斯·杜安尼和伊丽莎白·普拉特－兹伊贝克设计了一种快速的协商机制，名为专家研讨会议，实际上是一种多日集中计划会议。
项目经理与区域规划官员合作设计出一种机制以确定参与研讨会议的人员及达成共识的方法。接下来，研讨会议会在项目现场或者附近召开。在一系列的会议上，工程师、建筑师和设计师与政客和当地支持者就计划进行讨论以促成全体人员的接受。
项目规划者甚至可以在会议现场设置一个设计室，这样，建议和批准的变更可以在它们被讨论的同时被具体展现出来。当结论确定下来后，批准的计划会发布出来。
避免超支
当替换旧金山奥克兰海湾大桥东侧跨径的计划最初被提出时，预算是15亿美元。四年后，据Engineering News Record报道，预算上升至28.7亿美元。本特·弗莱杰格及其团队认为，在20个国家内开展的大型项目中，实际上有90％经历过预算超支。他们研究发现，典型的项目超支大约为28％。
Danish公司报告显示，超支的原因是由于项目赞助人低估了成本并且高估了收益以获取决策者的支持。“歪曲事实在发展中国家非常严重，在美国等发达经济体中也广泛存在。”
但在某些情况下，项目计划阶段的每个人都可能成为过度乐观估计的受害人。“项目进度变得越来越紧张；合同变得越来越严格；开工日期持续推后而结束时间却没有相应延迟，这一切导致了极端压缩的项目计划。”朗·斯特鲁普和华伦·P·内勒做出如上解释。斯特鲁普是美国联邦航空管理局（FAA）认证及安全主管，内勒是欧洲航天和防务公司BAE system公司的系统安全经理。
斯特鲁普和内勒合著了一份题为《预算与进度——忽视的危险》的FAA研究报告，此报告关注于安全及其与预算超支的关系。他们注意到有时候快速跟进的进度不可更改，然而，项目本身却可以更有效的运营。
两位作者推荐了几种有效的策略。例如，有些项目中的安全工程与开发团队是分开的，这样导致了两个团队的目标不一致。如果两个团队合并，他们的目标是一致起来。还有，项目经理要清楚了解进度会如何影响安全和质量，然后做出结果权衡。
技术悖论
还有一些目的是开发技术解决方案的大型项目步履蹒跚。看看磁悬浮铁路吧，乍一看，磁悬浮是最优雅的大规模运输形式，列车沿着磁轨以300英里每小时的速度安静地飞驰而过。德国耗资数百万欧元研制载人磁悬浮原型以期保持他们在这个新兴领域的领导地位。作为德国研发集团的一分子，西门子公司和蒂森克虏伯公司将开启一个耗资60亿欧元，长达185英里连接柏林和汉堡的铁路线，但距开工数月前，项目被紧急叫停。
环保者担忧磁悬浮列车对健康存在潜在危害。其他批评者声称在法国和日本已经成功应用的高速铁路可以达到同等运力并且费用低廉。类似于先前被取消的协和式飞机，磁悬浮可能会变成技术解决方案而停滞不前。
这又是一个已经耗资数百万的项目由于政治因素受阻的案例。可行的补救措施是举行那种类似于杜安尼和普拉特－兹伊贝克组织过的那种专家研讨会，这样可以及早地讨论不同的意见。
私募资金同样可以减少官僚主义形式。私募资金提供者更加倾向于经济上最优解决方案而不是技术上的独特方案。事实上，许多象菲律宾、马来西亚、泰国和香港这样的非工业国家和地区正在开发如大型收费公路等私募投资的项目。
有效设计
对于缺乏土地的城区，新式公路显得不太实际。挑战在于如何改建已有交通网络以承载不断增长的交通流量。自动收费系统或交通阻塞报警装置会有些作用，但是只有在公路优化设计能使驾驶者得到最有效的导航时，这些设施才起作用。
模拟确实会很有帮助：美国爱荷华大学的美国高级驾驶模拟器实验室可以模拟公路交叉路口最复杂的混乱情形。实验室首席技术官伊安尼斯·帕比利斯说：“这套模拟器是一个仿真程度很高的虚拟环境。”
帕比利斯说：“驾驶者坐在像盒子一样的模拟器里面的一辆真车里，环绕四周的屏幕显示出虚拟的路况和50辆计算机模拟出来的汽车。”模拟器还可以模拟出不同的天气状况、速度和交通流量。通过使用几个人员测试项目，规划者在开始具体实施建造之前就可以对他们自己的设计友好性有所把握。
帕比利斯说：“实际上，模拟器变成了一个虚拟的原型机，模拟出的任何明显问题都会在设计时避免。
遗留问题
澳大利亚咨询公司SMEC的库马认为，大型项目本质上会长期的耗费大量资金，这样减少了项目规划的灵活性。SMEC网站上的一份报告称：“大型项目的管理极端复杂，在某些情况下好像任何人都控制不了。”而且，它们的规模可能暗示：对环境的影响是确定的，但可能难以预计影响的程度。
SMEC注意到，这些问题早在1970和1980年代就被世界银行这样的组织提出，但由于某些原因至今仍未解决。他们认为，没有证据表明建筑项目的规模因此受到限制。
掌握如何将象研讨会、严格监督、多样融资和模拟等问题解决策略融合进项目计划的项目经理的前景被普遍看好。
作者简介：Mark Ingebretsen为《华尔街日报》网络版撰写每日观察专栏。他的新作《Why Companies Fail》已于2003年5月出版。
附文：案例分析
在当今社会，资金快速流动，工程经验迅速共享，人们不能对创新思想有所保留。
●重新规划香港国际机场。被正在扩建的香港赤腊角机场取代的闲置机场座落于世界上最昂贵的土地上。此规划需要安排约有25万居民的住房，包括交通干线、公园和娱乐设施等。
诸如此类的大型项目最为困难的工作在于设计一个总体规划并让所有项目干系人接受。在回收利用香港部分港口的问题上已存在争论，可能的建筑污染问题也备受关注，还有部分的反对意见来源于缺乏一个统一的设计主题。
●达拉斯三叉河走廊工程。现在的三叉河仅仅是一条“季节性河流”。不过，规划者希望将它变成一个多季节的娱乐区域，包括湖区，绿化带和具有未来开发潜力的公园。以上这些项目耗资预算达12亿美元。
规划过程就用了好几年。直到现在，横跨此区域的公园道路路线仍有六条提议。然而，规划者试图预见未来半个世纪达拉斯将会如何使用这个区域，以此来寻求使其设计经受时间考验。
●国家单轨铁路网。部分规划者相信，一个全国范围内的单轨铁路网会无缝连接客货运地铁和时速达250英里每小时的长途列车。
一个提议方案是在公路上方修建单轨铁路来覆盖公路网。很显然，这个方案会给设计者带来挑战，这需要提供住房和其他的城市用地。公路上方的空间甚至会被卖给开发者以支付单轨铁路的建设费用。
●白令海峡隧道。连接西伯利亚和阿拉斯加的隧道会极大地促进全球贸易。预计耗资400亿美元的白令海峡隧道工程可能会成为历史上最大的私募投资运输建筑项目。
有两个岛屿座落于海峡中间，这样，实际的海底长度不会比英法海底隧道更长。然而，真正的挑战在于如何连接世界两极人口中心已有的工程。目前，白令海峡阿拉斯加端没有公路或铁路通往人类社区，据说俄罗斯端的距离更为遥远。
原文：
Taming the Beast
By Mark Ingebretsen
Political infighting, cost overruns and faulty designs characterize many large projects. With a little project ingenuity and know-how, project managers can prevent these headaches.
Building the Tucurui Dam would not be easy. Located in northeastern Brazil’s lush and remote Amazon region, the dam and its adjacent dykes would encompass some 12,500 meters of concrete, creating a 2,850 square-kilometer lake.
However, problems cropped up during the Tucurui Dam’s construction – issues that often necessitated expensive decisions to change the original plan. Some decisions, including the use of more expensive Brazilian cement instead of material from neighboring Columbia, were made after political outcry. Others, such as the three-year delay in opening the dam’s hydroelectric power plant, resulted when expected funding didn’t materialize. Still other decisions, like the one to abandon a planned system of locks to accommodate shipping, arose out of expediency. With funding in short supply, it proved more feasible to ship ores mined nearby via rail instead of barge.
As a result of these changes, the Tucurui Dam, which was estimated to cost US$3.6 billion when first conceived in 1974, ended up costing more than &5.5 billion when it was delivered 12 years later.
In fact, megaprojects are notorious for the megaproblems they bring. “There is a paradox here” according to Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzilius and Werner Rothengatter, authors of Megaprojects and Risk [Cambridge University Press]. While “more and much larger infrastructure projects are being proposed and built around the world,” they say, “it is becoming clear that many such projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy, environment and public support.”
Over Troubled Waters
Politics can delay projects for years and run up project costs, while incurring even higher opportunity costs for stakeholders. Case in point: The Woodrow Wilson Bridge, long familiar to workers in Washington, D.C., USA, for its frequent delays. Designed to carry 75,000 cars per day, the bridge sees more than 200,000 vehicles daily. Although both the U.S. states of Maryland and Virginia recognized the need to improve the bridge, it took more than a decade before work could begin.
“For years, the governors of Maryland and Virginia battled over which state should pay for cost overruns and which would own the bridge,” according to Washington Business Forward. That squabbling reportedly led to $300 million in cost overruns.
Other groups saw the snarled bridge traffic as an opportunity to promote their own agenda, namely expanding the capital city’s metro system by building a rail line right over the bridge. This strategy meant to keep businesses in Washington’s urban center, thus discouraging suburban sprawl. Still other groups believed increasing the number of lanes on the Wilson Bridge would alleviate the costly snarl.
With so many stakeholders, more project managers wisely build dispute resolution tactics right into a project’s overall plan, says Patrick , director of the Melbourne, Australia-based project management firm, Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd. When disputes first arise, he says, outside experts might appraise the situation and offer their recommendations.
As a next step, mediators might enter the picture to work out a compromise. Failing that, arbitration – where solutions are imposed – could follow. By progressing through these steps, expensive, time-consuming litigation is a last resort.
If the process sounds easy, it isn’t. You must understand when to take each step, says. For example, if a mediator comes on board too soon, “the parties may still feel disenfranchised and uncommitted to resolution,” he says. If project manager wait too long to introduce a mediator, stakeholders may develop hard feelings.
In some instances, however, there simply isn’t enough time for an incremental escalation of dispute resolution tactics. Architects and urban planners Andres Duany and Elizabeth Platter-Zyberk have devised a faster negotiating method, namely intensive multiday planning sessions called charrettes (the term comes from the week-long exhibits held by graduating French art students).
Working with planning and zoning officials, project managers devise a plan for how approvals will be obtained and what individuals should be brought into the charrette process. Then comes the charrette itself, which may occur at or near the project site. During a series of meetings, engineers, builders and designers discuss plans with politicians and local advocacy groups to promote universal buy-in.
Project planners even may create a working design office at the meeting site, so suggestions and agreed changes can be incorporated as they’re being discussed. When the process concludes, the approved plan can be publicized.
The Cost Runneth Over
When plans first emerged to replace the East Span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, initial cost estimates were put at $1.5 billion. Four years later, the estimated cost rose to $2.87 billion, according to Engineering News Record (ENR). In fact, 90 percent of megaprojects of megaprojects undertaken in 20 nations experienced cost overruns, according to Flyvbjerg and his team. The typical project comes in about 28 percent over budget, the groups study found.
As for the causes, the Danish-funded group report that project sponsors can understate costs and overstate benefits to win over policy makers. “Distortions are worst in developing countries but also are widespread in the U.S. and other advanced economies.”
But in some cases, everyone involved I the project planning phase can fall victim to overly optimistic expectations. “Schedules for programs have become increasingly more aggressive, contracts have become increasingly more restrictive and start dates are continually pushed back without corresponding relief on the back end, resulting in extremely compressed schedules,” according to Ron Stroup, certification and safety lead with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Warren P. Naylor, system safety manager with European aerospace and defense firm BAE Systems.
The two authored an FAA study titled “Cost & Schedule – The Overlooked Hazards” that focused on safety and its relationship to cost overruns. They noted that sometimes fast-track schedules can’t be changed. However, the projects themselves can be run more effectively.
The authors suggest several more efficient strategies. For example, with some projects, safety engineering is kept separate from the development team, resulting in two teams with disconnected goals. But if the groups merge, their goals will be consistent, Stroup and Naylor suggest. What’s more, project managers gain a clearer understanding of how those schedules may affect safety and quality and then address the resulting trade-offs.
A Technology Love Story
Still other megaprojects flounder when their starting point is a technological solution in search of a problem. Consider magnetic levitation (maglev) trains. At first glance, maglev would seem to be the most elegant form of mass transit ever conceived. Cars whisk along silently at 300 miles per hour supported only by a magnetic field. Germany, wishing to secure its leadership in the nascent technology, has spent millions developing a prototype that proved capable of carrying passengers. As part of a German development group, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp were just months away from beginning a $6 billion, 185-mile train route connecting Berlin to Hamburg when the project was summarily halted.
Environmental groups voiced concern over the potential health hazards of magnetic fields. Other critics contended that conventional high-speed rail systems already used in France and Japan could transport people nearly as fast at far less cost. Like the cancelled Concorde supersonic jetliner service, maglev may have been a solution in search of a problem.
Again, here is a case of a project becoming mired in politics after millions already had been spent developing it. The remedy might have been to hold a charrette along the lines of those organized by Duany and Platter-Zyberk so differences could be openly discussed early on.
Enlisting private funding sources also can minimize bureaucratic red tape. Those who provide this funding are more likely to favor a solution that works best from an economic standpoint than to champion a particular technological solution. In fact, many non-industrialized nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong are developing privately funded projects such as large-scale toll roads.
Inefficient Designs
In many land-scarce urban areas, new highways are no longer practical. The challenge is to revamp existing traffic networks to carry an ever-growing volume of traffic. Systems to automatically collect tolls or alert motorists to traffic delays can help, but they only work well when the highway’s design is optimized so drivers can navigate with maximum efficiency.
That’s where simulation can help: The National Advanced Driving Simulator at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa, USA, for example, can duplicate what it will be like to navigate the most complex tangle of interchanging highways before any work actually begins. “It’s a very high-fidelity virtual environment,” says Yiannis Papelis, chief technical officer at the facility.
A driver sitting in an actual car inside the boxlike simulator is surrounded by screens that depict the virtual road, along with up to 50 computer-generated cars, Papelis says. Simulations can feign varying weather conditions, speed and traffic flows. By using several human test subjects, planners get a sense of how driver-friendly their designs are before actual construction begins.
The simulation becomes, in effect, a virtual prototype, Papelis says, and problems that become evident through the simulation can be remedied in the design.
Said and Done
Large projects, by their very nature, consume vast amounts of capital over lengthy periods, reducing the flexibility in development planning, according to Cooma, Australia-based consulting firm SMEC. Moreover, megaprojects are “extremely complex to manage and seemed in some cases to be beyond any one’s control,” a report on the firm’s Web site explains. What’s more, their scale implies “that the environmental impact would be substantial but probably not readily calculable in advance.”
The firm notes that these concerns first addressed in the 1970s and 1980s by organizations like the World Bank remain unresolved in some cases. “But there is no evidence that the size of infrastructure projects has been constrained,” according to the company.
Project managers who know how to incorporate problem-minimizing strategies like charrettes, proper oversight, innovative funding and simulations into their plans will be much in demand.
Mark Ingebretsen writes the Daily Scan column for the Wall Street Journal Online. His latest book, Why Companies Fail, was published in May.
Under Scrutiny
In today’s world of fast-moving capital and rapidly expanding engineering know-how, there’s no shortage of envelope-pushing ideas.
Redeveloping Hong Kong’s International Airport. Replaced by the sprawling Chek Lap Kok, Hong Kong’s now-vacant airport rests on some of the world’s most expensive real estate. Plans call for housing for an estimated 250,000 residents plus improved transportation arteries, along with parks and recreation.
As might be expected with a project of this size, the hardest task can be devising a master plan that all stakeholders will sign onto. Already disagreements have been reported over plans to reclaim some of Hong Kong’s harbor for the project. Others have raised concerns over possible pollution resulting from the construction and still others have objected to what they claim is lack of a unified design theme.
Dallas Trinity River Corridor Projects. At present, the Trinity River is only a “seasonal creek.” But planners in Dallas hope to transform it into a multiseason recreation area that would include several lakes, greenbelt areas and parks to serve as a catalyst for further development along its borders – all at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.
Planning has taken years. Even now, there are six proposed routes for a parkway that will traverse the area. Nevertheless, project planners have sought to make their designs stand the test of time by attempting to envision how the city will make use of the area midway through this century.
National Monorail Grid. Some planners believe a nationwide monorail network could seamlessly link metro systems carrying passengers and freight with longer-range trains traveling at 250 miles per hour.
One proposed solution would locate the monorail right above existing highways in metropolitan areas by covering the highways. While this would certainly present challenges to designers, it would provide needed room for housing and other urban development. Space above the highways might even be sold to developers to help pay for the monorail system.
The Bering Straits Tunnel. A tunnel linking Siberia with Alaska could greatly speed the flow of global commerce. At an estimated cost of $40 billion, the Bering Straits tunnel easily would be the largest privately funded transportation project in history.
With two islands conveniently located midway across the strait, the actual underwater distances aren’t appreciably greater than those overcome in building the Chunnel connecting the United Kingdom with France. However, the real challenge may well be linking both ends of the completed project with major population centers on either side of the world. Presently the communities on the Alaskan side of the Bering Strait aren’t even reachable by road way or rail, and the Russian region is said to be even more remote.
政治斗争、预算超支和设计缺陷困扰着许多的大型项目。项目经理可以通过一些创新和策略来避免上述令人头痛的状况。
建造图库鲁伊大坝是一件异常艰巨的工作。图库鲁伊大坝座落于巴西东北部偏远繁茂的亚马逊地区，大坝和相邻的筑堤用长达12.5公里的混凝土围成了一个面积达2850平方公里的湖区。
然而在图库鲁伊大坝的建设过程中，问题突现出来：经常会发生一些问题招致代价昂贵的决策，迫使原计划变更。某些决策是在政治抗议的背景下做出的，比如使用昂贵的巴西水泥替代哥伦比亚的原材料。另外一些决策则起因于预期的资金未到位，例如，大坝水电站推迟三年投入使用。还有部分决策，像废弃一种水闸系统以适应运输要求则是由费用原因引起的。在资金供给短缺时，通过火车取代驳船运输矿石则更为可行。
这些变更导致的一个结果是，在1974年估计预算36亿美元的图库鲁伊大坝最终在12年后交付时花费超过55亿美元。
实际上，大型项目通常会因其导致的问题而声名狼藉。《Megaprojects and Risk》一书的作者本特·弗莱杰格、尼尔斯·布鲁兹利斯和沃纳·罗森加特尔表示：“现在存在一个矛盾：在全球计划和建造更多更大建筑项目的同时，有个趋势变得愈加明显，即诸如此类的项目在经济、环境和公共支持上的记录表现明显差劲。
解决纠纷
政治因素会拖延项目数年并耗尽项目预算，而且还会导致更高的潜在费用。如下即是一个案例：伍德鲁·威尔逊大桥由于其频繁的推迟开工而广为美国华盛顿的工人们熟知。大桥的设计车流量是每天7.5万辆，而现在每天有超过20万辆车过桥。尽管美国马里兰州和弗吉尼亚州都意识到扩建大桥的必要性，但是实际开工之前却浪费了超过十年。
Washington Business Forward杂志指出：“数年来，马里兰州和弗吉尼亚州的州长们为了预算超支部分的付费方和大桥的所有权等事情争吵不休。”据说，这些争吵导致了3亿美元的超支。
某些利益集团将大桥混乱的交通状况当作是促进自己计划的机会，即通过修建一条桥上铁路来扩展首都的地铁系统。这个策略意味着将商业保留在华盛顿市区，这样会限制郊区的蔓延。而另一些集团认为增加威尔逊桥上车道的数量会减轻耗费巨大的交通混乱。
由于存在如此多的项目干系人，更多明智的项目经理将纠纷解决方法写入总体项目计划中，帕特里克·韦弗如是说。韦弗是澳大利亚墨尔本的项目管理公司Mosaic项目服务公司的总监。他认为，当纷争发生时，外部专家会评估现状并提供建议。
下一步，调节人会参与进来指定出折衷方案。调解失败的话，就会诉诸仲裁，这样，解决方案就是强制的。以上步骤失败之后，耗时又昂贵的诉讼就是最后的手段了。
韦弗说，这套流程比较复杂，你必须了解采取每一步骤的适当时机。例如，如果调解人过早地发挥作用，各方会感觉权利被剥夺而不会认同调解人的方案。如果项目经理让调解人介入太晚的话，项目干系人会相互产生反感。
然而，在某些情况下，没有足够的时间执行层层上报的纠纷解决方法。城市规划和建筑师安德鲁斯·杜安尼和伊丽莎白·普拉特－兹伊贝克设计了一种快速的协商机制，名为专家研讨会议，实际上是一种多日集中计划会议。
项目经理与区域规划官员合作设计出一种机制以确定参与研讨会议的人员及达成共识的方法。接下来，研讨会议会在项目现场或者附近召开。在一系列的会议上，工程师、建筑师和设计师与政客和当地支持者就计划进行讨论以促成全体人员的接受。
项目规划者甚至可以在会议现场设置一个设计室，这样，建议和批准的变更可以在它们被讨论的同时被具体展现出来。当结论确定下来后，批准的计划会发布出来。
避免超支
当替换旧金山奥克兰海湾大桥东侧跨径的计划最初被提出时，预算是15亿美元。四年后，据Engineering News Record报道，预算上升至28.7亿美元。本特·弗莱杰格及其团队认为，在20个国家内开展的大型项目中，实际上有90％经历过预算超支。他们研究发现，典型的项目超支大约为28％。
Danish公司报告显示，超支的原因是由于项目赞助人低估了成本并且高估了收益以获取决策者的支持。“歪曲事实在发展中国家非常严重，在美国等发达经济体中也广泛存在。”
但在某些情况下，项目计划阶段的每个人都可能成为过度乐观估计的受害人。“项目进度变得越来越紧张；合同变得越来越严格；开工日期持续推后而结束时间却没有相应延迟，这一切导致了极端压缩的项目计划。”朗·斯特鲁普和华伦·P·内勒做出如上解释。斯特鲁普是美国联邦航空管理局（FAA）认证及安全主管，内勒是欧洲航天和防务公司BAE system公司的系统安全经理。
斯特鲁普和内勒合著了一份题为《预算与进度——忽视的危险》的FAA研究报告，此报告关注于安全及其与预算超支的关系。他们注意到有时候快速跟进的进度不可更改，然而，项目本身却可以更有效的运营。
两位作者推荐了几种有效的策略。例如，有些项目中的安全工程与开发团队是分开的，这样导致了两个团队的目标不一致。如果两个团队合并，他们的目标是一致起来。还有，项目经理要清楚了解进度会如何影响安全和质量，然后做出结果权衡。
技术悖论
还有一些目的是开发技术解决方案的大型项目步履蹒跚。看看磁悬浮铁路吧，乍一看，磁悬浮是最优雅的大规模运输形式，列车沿着磁轨以300英里每小时的速度安静地飞驰而过。德国耗资数百万欧元研制载人磁悬浮原型以期保持他们在这个新兴领域的领导地位。作为德国研发集团的一分子，西门子公司和蒂森克虏伯公司将开启一个耗资60亿欧元，长达185英里连接柏林和汉堡的铁路线，但距开工数月前，项目被紧急叫停。
环保者担忧磁悬浮列车对健康存在潜在危害。其他批评者声称在法国和日本已经成功应用的高速铁路可以达到同等运力并且费用低廉。类似于先前被取消的协和式飞机，磁悬浮可能会变成技术解决方案而停滞不前。
这又是一个已经耗资数百万的项目由于政治因素受阻的案例。可行的补救措施是举行那种类似于杜安尼和普拉特－兹伊贝克组织过的那种专家研讨会，这样可以及早地讨论不同的意见。
私募资金同样可以减少官僚主义形式。私募资金提供者更加倾向于经济上最优解决方案而不是技术上的独特方案。事实上，许多象菲律宾、马来西亚、泰国和香港这样的非工业国家和地区正在开发如大型收费公路等私募投资的项目。
有效设计
对于缺乏土地的城区，新式公路显得不太实际。挑战在于如何改建已有交通网络以承载不断增长的交通流量。自动收费系统或交通阻塞报警装置会有些作用，但是只有在公路优化设计能使驾驶者得到最有效的导航时，这些设施才起作用。
模拟确实会很有帮助：美国爱荷华大学的美国高级驾驶模拟器实验室可以模拟公路交叉路口最复杂的混乱情形。实验室首席技术官伊安尼斯·帕比利斯说：“这套模拟器是一个仿真程度很高的虚拟环境。”
帕比利斯说：“驾驶者坐在像盒子一样的模拟器里面的一辆真车里，环绕四周的屏幕显示出虚拟的路况和50辆计算机模拟出来的汽车。”模拟器还可以模拟出不同的天气状况、速度和交通流量。通过使用几个人员测试项目，规划者在开始具体实施建造之前就可以对他们自己的设计友好性有所把握。
帕比利斯说：“实际上，模拟器变成了一个虚拟的原型机，模拟出的任何明显问题都会在设计时避免。
遗留问题
澳大利亚咨询公司SMEC的库马认为，大型项目本质上会长期的耗费大量资金，这样减少了项目规划的灵活性。SMEC网站上的一份报告称：“大型项目的管理极端复杂，在某些情况下好像任何人都控制不了。”而且，它们的规模可能暗示：对环境的影响是确定的，但可能难以预计影响的程度。
SMEC注意到，这些问题早在1970和1980年代就被世界银行这样的组织提出，但由于某些原因至今仍未解决。他们认为，没有证据表明建筑项目的规模因此受到限制。
掌握如何将象研讨会、严格监督、多样融资和模拟等问题解决策略融合进项目计划的项目经理的前景被普遍看好。
作者简介：Mark Ingebretsen为《华尔街日报》网络版撰写每日观察专栏。他的新作《Why Companies Fail》已于2003年5月出版。
附文：案例分析
在当今社会，资金快速流动，工程经验迅速共享，人们不能对创新思想有所保留。
●重新规划香港国际机场。被正在扩建的香港赤腊角机场取代的闲置机场座落于世界上最昂贵的土地上。此规划需要安排约有25万居民的住房，包括交通干线、公园和娱乐设施等。
诸如此类的大型项目最为困难的工作在于设计一个总体规划并让所有项目干系人接受。在回收利用香港部分港口的问题上已存在争论，可能的建筑污染问题也备受关注，还有部分的反对意见来源于缺乏一个统一的设计主题。
●达拉斯三叉河走廊工程。现在的三叉河仅仅是一条“季节性河流”。不过，规划者希望将它变成一个多季节的娱乐区域，包括湖区，绿化带和具有未来开发潜力的公园。以上这些项目耗资预算达12亿美元。
规划过程就用了好几年。直到现在，横跨此区域的公园道路路线仍有六条提议。然而，规划者试图预见未来半个世纪达拉斯将会如何使用这个区域，以此来寻求使其设计经受时间考验。
●国家单轨铁路网。部分规划者相信，一个全国范围内的单轨铁路网会无缝连接客货运地铁和时速达250英里每小时的长途列车。
一个提议方案是在公路上方修建单轨铁路来覆盖公路网。很显然，这个方案会给设计者带来挑战，这需要提供住房和其他的城市用地。公路上方的空间甚至会被卖给开发者以支付单轨铁路的建设费用。
●白令海峡隧道。连接西伯利亚和阿拉斯加的隧道会极大地促进全球贸易。预计耗资400亿美元的白令海峡隧道工程可能会成为历史上最大的私募投资运输建筑项目。
有两个岛屿座落于海峡中间，这样，实际的海底长度不会比英法海底隧道更长。然而，真正的挑战在于如何连接世界两极人口中心已有的工程。目前，白令海峡阿拉斯加端没有公路或铁路通往人类社区，据说俄罗斯端的距离更为遥远。
原文：
Taming the Beast
By Mark Ingebretsen
Political infighting, cost overruns and faulty designs characterize many large projects. With a little project ingenuity and know-how, project managers can prevent these headaches.
Building the Tucurui Dam would not be easy. Located in northeastern Brazil’s lush and remote Amazon region, the dam and its adjacent dykes would encompass some 12,500 meters of concrete, creating a 2,850 square-kilometer lake.
However, problems cropped up during the Tucurui Dam’s construction – issues that often necessitated expensive decisions to change the original plan. Some decisions, including the use of more expensive Brazilian cement instead of material from neighboring Columbia, were made after political outcry. Others, such as the three-year delay in opening the dam’s hydroelectric power plant, resulted when expected funding didn’t materialize. Still other decisions, like the one to abandon a planned system of locks to accommodate shipping, arose out of expediency. With funding in short supply, it proved more feasible to ship ores mined nearby via rail instead of barge.
As a result of these changes, the Tucurui Dam, which was estimated to cost US$3.6 billion when first conceived in 1974, ended up costing more than &5.5 billion when it was delivered 12 years later.
In fact, megaprojects are notorious for the megaproblems they bring. “There is a paradox here” according to Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzilius and Werner Rothengatter, authors of Megaprojects and Risk [Cambridge University Press]. While “more and much larger infrastructure projects are being proposed and built around the world,” they say, “it is becoming clear that many such projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy, environment and public support.”
Over Troubled Waters
Politics can delay projects for years and run up project costs, while incurring even higher opportunity costs for stakeholders. Case in point: The Woodrow Wilson Bridge, long familiar to workers in Washington, D.C., USA, for its frequent delays. Designed to carry 75,000 cars per day, the bridge sees more than 200,000 vehicles daily. Although both the U.S. states of Maryland and Virginia recognized the need to improve the bridge, it took more than a decade before work could begin.
“For years, the governors of Maryland and Virginia battled over which state should pay for cost overruns and which would own the bridge,” according to Washington Business Forward. That squabbling reportedly led to $300 million in cost overruns.
Other groups saw the snarled bridge traffic as an opportunity to promote their own agenda, namely expanding the capital city’s metro system by building a rail line right over the bridge. This strategy meant to keep businesses in Washington’s urban center, thus discouraging suburban sprawl. Still other groups believed increasing the number of lanes on the Wilson Bridge would alleviate the costly snarl.
With so many stakeholders, more project managers wisely build dispute resolution tactics right into a project’s overall plan, says Patrick , director of the Melbourne, Australia-based project management firm, Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd. When disputes first arise, he says, outside experts might appraise the situation and offer their recommendations.
As a next step, mediators might enter the picture to work out a compromise. Failing that, arbitration – where solutions are imposed – could follow. By progressing through these steps, expensive, time-consuming litigation is a last resort.
If the process sounds easy, it isn’t. You must understand when to take each step, says. For example, if a mediator comes on board too soon, “the parties may still feel disenfranchised and uncommitted to resolution,” he says. If project manager wait too long to introduce a mediator, stakeholders may develop hard feelings.
In some instances, however, there simply isn’t enough time for an incremental escalation of dispute resolution tactics. Architects and urban planners Andres Duany and Elizabeth Platter-Zyberk have devised a faster negotiating method, namely intensive multiday planning sessions called charrettes (the term comes from the week-long exhibits held by graduating French art students).
Working with planning and zoning officials, project managers devise a plan for how approvals will be obtained and what individuals should be brought into the charrette process. Then comes the charrette itself, which may occur at or near the project site. During a series of meetings, engineers, builders and designers discuss plans with politicians and local advocacy groups to promote universal buy-in.
Project planners even may create a working design office at the meeting site, so suggestions and agreed changes can be incorporated as they’re being discussed. When the process concludes, the approved plan can be publicized.
The Cost Runneth Over
When plans first emerged to replace the East Span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, initial cost estimates were put at $1.5 billion. Four years later, the estimated cost rose to $2.87 billion, according to Engineering News Record (ENR). In fact, 90 percent of megaprojects of megaprojects undertaken in 20 nations experienced cost overruns, according to Flyvbjerg and his team. The typical project comes in about 28 percent over budget, the groups study found.
As for the causes, the Danish-funded group report that project sponsors can understate costs and overstate benefits to win over policy makers. “Distortions are worst in developing countries but also are widespread in the U.S. and other advanced economies.”
But in some cases, everyone involved I the project planning phase can fall victim to overly optimistic expectations. “Schedules for programs have become increasingly more aggressive, contracts have become increasingly more restrictive and start dates are continually pushed back without corresponding relief on the back end, resulting in extremely compressed schedules,” according to Ron Stroup, certification and safety lead with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Warren P. Naylor, system safety manager with European aerospace and defense firm BAE Systems.
The two authored an FAA study titled “Cost & Schedule – The Overlooked Hazards” that focused on safety and its relationship to cost overruns. They noted that sometimes fast-track schedules can’t be changed. However, the projects themselves can be run more effectively.
The authors suggest several more efficient strategies. For example, with some projects, safety engineering is kept separate from the development team, resulting in two teams with disconnected goals. But if the groups merge, their goals will be consistent, Stroup and Naylor suggest. What’s more, project managers gain a clearer understanding of how those schedules may affect safety and quality and then address the resulting trade-offs.
A Technology Love Story
Still other megaprojects flounder when their starting point is a technological solution in search of a problem. Consider magnetic levitation (maglev) trains. At first glance, maglev would seem to be the most elegant form of mass transit ever conceived. Cars whisk along silently at 300 miles per hour supported only by a magnetic field. Germany, wishing to secure its leadership in the nascent technology, has spent millions developing a prototype that proved capable of carrying passengers. As part of a German development group, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp were just months away from beginning a $6 billion, 185-mile train route connecting Berlin to Hamburg when the project was summarily halted.
Environmental groups voiced concern over the potential health hazards of magnetic fields. Other critics contended that conventional high-speed rail systems already used in France and Japan could transport people nearly as fast at far less cost. Like the cancelled Concorde supersonic jetliner service, maglev may have been a solution in search of a problem.
Again, here is a case of a project becoming mired in politics after millions already had been spent developing it. The remedy might have been to hold a charrette along the lines of those organized by Duany and Platter-Zyberk so differences could be openly discussed early on.
Enlisting private funding sources also can minimize bureaucratic red tape. Those who provide this funding are more likely to favor a solution that works best from an economic standpoint than to champion a particular technological solution. In fact, many non-industrialized nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong are developing privately funded projects such as large-scale toll roads.
Inefficient Designs
In many land-scarce urban areas, new highways are no longer practical. The challenge is to revamp existing traffic networks to carry an ever-growing volume of traffic. Systems to automatically collect tolls or alert motorists to traffic delays can help, but they only work well when the highway’s design is optimized so drivers can navigate with maximum efficiency.
That’s where simulation can help: The National Advanced Driving Simulator at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa, USA, for example, can duplicate what it will be like to navigate the most complex tangle of interchanging highways before any work actually begins. “It’s a very high-fidelity virtual environment,” says Yiannis Papelis, chief technical officer at the facility.
A driver sitting in an actual car inside the boxlike simulator is surrounded by screens that depict the virtual road, along with up to 50 computer-generated cars, Papelis says. Simulations can feign varying weather conditions, speed and traffic flows. By using several human test subjects, planners get a sense of how driver-friendly their designs are before actual construction begins.
The simulation becomes, in effect, a virtual prototype, Papelis says, and problems that become evident through the simulation can be remedied in the design.
Said and Done
Large projects, by their very nature, consume vast amounts of capital over lengthy periods, reducing the flexibility in development planning, according to Cooma, Australia-based consulting firm SMEC. Moreover, megaprojects are “extremely complex to manage and seemed in some cases to be beyond any one’s control,” a report on the firm’s Web site explains. What’s more, their scale implies “that the environmental impact would be substantial but probably not readily calculable in advance.”
The firm notes that these concerns first addressed in the 1970s and 1980s by organizations like the World Bank remain unresolved in some cases. “But there is no evidence that the size of infrastructure projects has been constrained,” according to the company.
Project managers who know how to incorporate problem-minimizing strategies like charrettes, proper oversight, innovative funding and simulations into their plans will be much in demand.
Mark Ingebretsen writes the Daily Scan column for the Wall Street Journal Online. His latest book, Why Companies Fail, was published in May.
Under Scrutiny
In today’s world of fast-moving capital and rapidly expanding engineering know-how, there’s no shortage of envelope-pushing ideas.
Redeveloping Hong Kong’s International Airport. Replaced by the sprawling Chek Lap Kok, Hong Kong’s now-vacant airport rests on some of the world’s most expensive real estate. Plans call for housing for an estimated 250,000 residents plus improved transportation arteries, along with parks and recreation.
As might be expected with a project of this size, the hardest task can be devising a master plan that all stakeholders will sign onto. Already disagreements have been reported over plans to reclaim some of Hong Kong’s harbor for the project. Others have raised concerns over possible pollution resulting from the construction and still others have objected to what they claim is lack of a unified design theme.
Dallas Trinity River Corridor Projects. At present, the Trinity River is only a “seasonal creek.” But planners in Dallas hope to transform it into a multiseason recreation area that would include several lakes, greenbelt areas and parks to serve as a catalyst for further development along its borders – all at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.
Planning has taken years. Even now, there are six proposed routes for a parkway that will traverse the area. Nevertheless, project planners have sought to make their designs stand the test of time by attempting to envision how the city will make use of the area midway through this century.
National Monorail Grid. Some planners believe a nationwide monorail network could seamlessly link metro systems carrying passengers and freight with longer-range trains traveling at 250 miles per hour.
One proposed solution would locate the monorail right above existing highways in metropolitan areas by covering the highways. While this would certainly present challenges to designers, it would provide needed room for housing and other urban development. Space above the highways might even be sold to developers to help pay for the monorail system.
The Bering Straits Tunnel. A tunnel linking Siberia with Alaska could greatly speed the flow of global commerce. At an estimated cost of $40 billion, the Bering Straits tunnel easily would be the largest privately funded transportation project in history.
With two islands conveniently located midway across the strait, the actual underwater distances aren’t appreciably greater than those overcome in building the Chunnel connecting the United Kingdom with France. However, the real challenge may well be linking both ends of the completed project with major population centers on either side of the world. Presently the communities on the Alaskan side of the Bering Strait aren’t even reachable by road way or rail, and the Russian region is said to be even more remote.